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The U.S. government relies heavily on security cooperation and security 
assistance programs to build partner-nation capacity as a means of furthering 
U.S. national security interests. Special Operations Forces (SOF) have 
contributed to this effort, particularly in the training and advising of foreign forces. 
However, the overall alignment of these efforts can sometimes be problematic. 
Furthermore, in a fiscally austere environment, planners will be forced to make 
difficult decisions about which countries will yield the best results when SOF are 
employed to build capacity.  
This thesis uses two RAND reports—What Works Best When Building 
Partner Capacity and The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and 
Propensity Matching Tool, published in 2014, to assess which factors are most 
critical for SOF efforts to build partnership capacity. It then relates these factors 
to countries where SOF training and advising might be employed. It finds that the 
countries best suited to SOF training and advising are the ones that the RAND 
reports suggest are the least likely to build capacity. Given this insight, this thesis 
recommends that Theater Special Operations Commands continue to explore 
new and creative solutions for security cooperation programs while working with 
interagency actors and industry to build partnership capacity.  
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  SOF AND BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY IN A RESOURCE 
CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENT .................................................................. 1 
A.  BACKGROUND ................................................................................... 1 
B.  THESIS QUESTION AND METHODS ................................................. 2 
C.  THESIS OVERVIEW ............................................................................ 4 
II.  U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY COOPERATION .......................... 5 
A.  NATIONAL LEVEL .............................................................................. 5 
B.  THEATER LEVEL .............................................................................. 13 
C.  SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE .................................................... 17 
D.  DEPARTMENT OF STATE ................................................................ 19 
E.  CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 23 
III.  RAND TOOLS FOR ASSESSING BUILDING  PARTNERSHIP 
CAPACITY .................................................................................................... 25 
A.  WHAT WORKS BEST WHEN BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY 
AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES? ........................................ 25 
1.  Data ......................................................................................... 25 
2.  Findings .................................................................................. 27 
3.  Recommendations ................................................................. 29 
B.  THE RAND SECURITY COOPERATION PRIORITIZATION AND 
PROPENSITY MATCHING TOOL ..................................................... 31 
IV.  ANALYSIS .................................................................................................... 41 
A.  GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND TRENDS .................................... 42 
B.  IMPLICATIONS FOR CCMDS AND TSOCS ..................................... 48 
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................. 55 
LIST OF REFERENCES .......................................................................................... 61 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.  Security Cooperation Guidance Flow,  after Moroney et al., 2009, 
32. ........................................................................................................ 9 
Figure 2.  Notional Operation Plan Phases, from JP 5–0: Joint Operational 
Planning 2011, III-39. ......................................................................... 15 
Figure 3.  Global Force Management Process, from Introduction to Global 
Force Management 5 April 2014. ....................................................... 16 
Figure 4.  Security Forces Assistance Coordination, from JDN 1–13: Security 
Force Assistance 29 April 2013, II-3. .................................................. 18 
Figure 5.  U.S. Government Organization for Security Cooperation and 
Security Assistance. From The Management of Security 
Cooperation 2013, 3–3. ...................................................................... 22 
Figure 6.  Venn Diagram of the Subset of Phases in the Data,  from Paul et 
al., 2013, 55. ....................................................................................... 27 
Figure 7.  Summary of Case Studies, Factors, and BPC Effectiveness, from 
Paul et al., 2013, 9.............................................................................. 33 
Figure 8.  Screenshot of “Top Sheet” Spreadsheet, from The RAND Security 
Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool. .................. 39 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.  GEF Groupings of Countries / Organizations, from Sweeney 2011, 
3. ........................................................................................................ 11 
Table 2.  Tool Categories and Constructs,  from Paul et al., 2013, 14–15. ....... 35 
Table 3.  FY10 Total SC/SFA/BPC Expenditures from The RAND Security 
Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool. .................. 44 
Table 4.  Data for Category 5: Absorptive Capacity of PN Military, from The 
RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching 
Tool. ................................................................................................... 47 
Table 5.  Countries by overall summary propensity score,  after The RAND 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
BPC building partner capacity 
CCMD  Combatant Command 
CF conventional forces 
COIN counterinsurgency 
COM chief of mission 
DATT Defense Attaché 
DOD Department of Defense 
DOS Department of State 
FID foreign internal defense 
FSF foreign security forces 
GCC Geographic Combatant Command 
GEF Guidance for the Employment of the Force 
GFIM Global Force Management Implementation Guidance 
HN host nation 
OPLAN operations plan 
OPORD operations order 
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 
PN partner nation 
QDR quadrennial defense review 
SA security assistance 
SC security cooperation 
SCO security cooperation organization 
SDO senior defense official 
SECDEF Secretary of Defense 
SF special forces 
SFA security force assistance 
SOF special operation forces 
TSOC Theater Special Operations Command 
USAFRICOM United States Africa Command 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
 xiv
USCENTCOM  United States Central Command 
USEUCOM  United States European Command 
USG United States Government 
USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command 
USPACOM United States Pacific Command 
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 






I would like to thank the staff, faculty, and students of the Defense 
Analysis Department for a brilliant experience and first-class education. I’d 
especially like to thank Professor Heather Gregg for her mentorship and 
encouragement; without her help, this thesis would not have been possible. 
Thanks also go to Professor George Lober for his guidance and patience; and to 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1
I. SOF AND BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY IN A 
RESOURCE CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENT 
A. BACKGROUND 
In 2012, influenced by recent fiscal constraints and over a decade of war, 
President Barak Obama set the course for a new national security strategy that 
altered the means by which the United States protects American interests while 
sustaining its leadership role in the world. President Obama’s 2012 Defense 
Strategic Guidance claims, “The balance between available resources and our 
security needs has never been more delicate.”1 This concern has prompted 
policymakers to look for new and more cost-effective ways to ensure national 
security.  
One of the means of addressing these national security objectives is 
through partnerships with foreign nations. In the 2012 Presidential Policy 
Directive 23: U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy, the President set four goals 
for U.S. Security Sector Assistance: 1) Help partner nations build sustainable 
capacity to address common security challenges; 2) Promote partner support for 
U.S. interests; 3) Promote universal values, such as good governance; and 4) 
Strengthen collective security and multinational defense arrangements and 
organizations.2 These goals were echoed in the president’s 2010 National 
Security Strategy and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance; both documents 
highlight the importance of the U.S. military’s role in “providing a stabilizing 
presence” in order to strengthen security relationships through building partner 
capacity.3   
                                            
1 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century 
Defense (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), 8. 
2 White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy,” 5 April 2013, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/04/05/fact-sheet-us-security-sector-assistance-
policy.  
3 White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2010), 41. 
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The Department of Defense, through United States Code Title 10 
authorities, is one of the many instruments used to build partner capacity, 
particularly military and security forces through security cooperation missions. 
However, as the lead agency for foreign affairs, the Department of State is the 
executive agent for security assistance programs.4 It does this through “a group 
of programs, authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961… by which the 
U.S. provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related 
services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of 
national policies and objectives.”5 
The diverse responsibilities between multiple agencies, authorizations, 
appropriations, and responsibilities makes building partnership capacity difficult 
to execute and measure. The 2013 and 2014 Budget Control Acts and 
sequestration cuts further complicate these divisions, likely leading to greater 
interagency and interdepartmental competition for resources and funding.6 
Additionally, each partner nation and region has its own unique set of varying 
circumstances that may not always align with U.S. policy objectives. All of these 
factors make building partnership capacity challenging. However, as the U. S. 
military moves from large-scale wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to limited 
engagements and security force assistance, how to build partnership capacity 
and match it to U.S. security interests deserves greater attention. 
B. THESIS QUESTION AND METHODS 
This thesis aims to assist USSOCOM and Theater Special Operation 
Command planners in developing theater support campaign plans to build 
partner capacity. This thesis will use two research reports, What Works Best 
                                            
4 Department of Defense, Security Force Assistance, Joint Doctrine Note 1–13 (Washington, 
DC: DOD, 29 April 2013), ix. 
5 Ibid., vii. 
6 Cheryl Pellerin, “Service Chiefs Detail 2014 Sequestration Effects,” American Forces Press 
Server, 19 September 2013, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120825.   
 3
When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?7 and The 
RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool,8 along 
with trends from recent SOF deployments to analyze current SOF efforts in 
building partner capacity. 
Specifically, this thesis will use the tools developed in these reports to test 
the likelihood of building partnership capacity in the countries in which SOF is 
either engaged or likely to engage in capacity-building activities. The reports 
argue that there are nine factors with strong correlation to successful capacity 
building: four under U.S control (funding, consistency, matching, sustainment), 
four under the control of the partner nation (funds, absorptive capacity, 
governance, economy), and one shared by both (security interests). However, 
the reports also note that national interest may outweigh the need for these 
preconditions. The reports provide quantitative and qualitative data on each 
country in the form of a spreadsheet containing analysts ratings of the nine 
factors that would lead to successful capacity building, this spreadsheet is then 
compared with recent SOF deployments to determine the most likely countries 
where SOF has the greatest indicators for successful capacity building.   
This thesis finds that most of the nine factors that correlate with successful 
capacity building are related to national-level policies or factors under the control 
of the partner nation. These factors can be difficult to change and take time 
however, the absorptive capacity of the partner nation military is one factor that 
can be quickly assessed through available quantitative data and confirmed with 
qualitative assessments by SOF units. When national policy or campaign plans 
call for capacity building, particularly those involving the training or advising of 
partner SOF or the use of U.S. SOF to build a capacity, the RAND tool can serve 
a starting point to build the case for security cooperation mission and the 
propensity for them to succeed.  
                                            
7 Christopher Paul et al., What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What 
Circumstances? RAND Report MG-1253/1-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013). 
8 Christopher Paul et al., The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity 
Matching Tool, RAND Report TL-112-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013). 
 4
C. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is composed of five chapters. Chapter II serves as a 
background and outline on how the United States government’s national security 
strategy is implemented into department level guidance and eventually becomes 
part of regional and country plans by the Department of Defense and Department 
of State. This thesis will mainly focus on the Department of Defense and its 
Security Cooperation programs that involve training by Special Operations 
Forces but will also include discussion of other agencies as they apply, like the 
State Department’s Security Assistance program.  
Chapter III will outline the initial RAND study, What Works Best When 
Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances and the derivative 
product, The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching 
Tool, as a quantitative means of developing a framework for assessing current 
SOF efforts to build partner capacity.   
Chapter IV will look at the data from the original RAND report and how the 
“matching tool” currently rates the propensity for successful U.S. security 
cooperation missions today. This chapter will make observations based on this 
data as to which countries are currently the most primed for SOF engagement 
and which countries would be the most challenging and why.   
Chapter V will provide conclusions and recommendations for Security 
Cooperation policies and operations that involve special operations forces and 
the selection partner nations to build capacity. In particular, this chapter will 
consider the likelihood of SOF efforts to build partnership capacity given the nine 
factors from the reports. It will conclude with suggestions for the way ahead. 
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II. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY COOPERATION 
In order to understand the role of security cooperation in U.S. national 
security strategy, it is important to consider national-level documents and policies 
that lay the groundwork for all U.S. foreign policy. This chapter begins by 
outlining key documents that pertain to U.S. national-level security strategies and 
policies and how they relate to security cooperation efforts. It then outlines the 
theater processes for developing campaign plans that operationalize the national 
defense strategy. Finally, the last section outlines the State Department’s 
processes for security assistance in relation to the Defense Department’s efforts.  
This chapter demonstrates the complex nature of security cooperation 
planning and execution and emphasizes the many agencies involved in the 
process. These constraints will then be considered in light of recent SOF efforts 
to build partnership capacity in several countries. 
A. NATIONAL LEVEL 
The President of the United States, according to public law as defined in 
the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, has 
the obligation to “transmit to Congress each year a comprehensive report on the 
national security strategy of the United States.”9 The Goldwater-Nichols Act 
specifies that the national security strategy of the United States address the 
following: 
The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States 
that are vital to the national security of the United States. 
The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense 
capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and 
to implement the national security strategy of the United States. 
The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, 
economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the 
                                            
9 See also USC 50 402 and Public Law 99–433 dated OCT 1, 1986. 
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United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the 
goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1). 
The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out 
the national security strategy of the United States, including an 
evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of 
the national power of the United States to support the 
implementation of the national security strategy. 
Such other information as may be necessary to help inform 
Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the 
United States.10 
The most current National Security Strategy was published by the Obama 
administration in May 2010. In a broad overview, the document defines the 
strategic environment and the administration’s strategy to pursue U.S. national 
interests which it defines as: “security, prosperity, values, and international 
order.”11 According to this document, the administration views its top security 
threat as weapons of mass that could be used by violent extremists groups, but 
also seeks to dismantle terrorists organizations that pose a threat to the U.S. or 
its allies, and promote security and prosperity which it views as universal values.   
The administration admits these are tough challenges and cannot be 
accomplished alone; therefore, it looks to strengthen alliances and build capacity 
in partner nations who seek similar national security interests. 
In support of the National Security Strategy, the Secretary of Defense 
publishes the National Defense Strategy periodically; the most recent version 
was published in January 2012 and titled “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: 
Priorities for 21st Century Defense.”12 This document clarifies the defense 
secretary’s priorities and defines the primary missions of the U.S. armed forces 
while generally outlining how the Department of Defense will meet the demands 
                                            
10 Goldwater–Nichols DOD Reorganization Act, 10 USC 162, 1986. 
11 White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2010), 17. 
12 Barack H. Obama and Leon E. Panetta, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 
21st Century Defense, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012). 
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of the National Security Strategy with acceptable risk.13  The secretary defines 
ten primary missions that the armed forces will focus on and generally how they 
should be executed. One of the primary missions, “provide a stabilizing 
presence,” is closely linked to security cooperation efforts and specifically calls 
for building partner capacity while acknowledging a reduction in resources.14 
In addition to the National Defense Strategy, the chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff is required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act to assist the president 
and secretary of defense in providing strategic direction for U.S. armed 
services.15 The purpose of the document is to define the ways and means in 
which the military will meet the national security strategy and the defense 
objectives of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which is a report 
generated every four years that sets a long-term course for the DOD as it 
assesses the threats and challenges that the nation faces, and re-balances the 
DOD’s strategies, capabilities, and forces to address today’s conflicts and 
tomorrow’s threats.16 The most recent version, published by Admiral Mullen in 
February 2011, advances three main themes,  
1. The joint force’s leadership is often as important as the military 
capabilities provided; 
2. The changing security environment requires the joint force to 
deepen security relationships with allies and create opportunities 
for partnership with new and diverse groups of actors; 
                                            
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 5. 
15 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), The National Military Strategy of the United 
States: Redefining America’s Military Leadership (Washington, DC: CJCS, 2011), i. 
16 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2014), I. 
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3. The joint force must prepare for an increasingly dynamic and 
uncertain future in which a full spectrum of military capabilities and 
attributes will be required to prevent and win the nation’s wars.17 
The National Military Strategy further defines the national military 
objectives as: 
 Counter violent extremism 
 Deter and defeat aggression 
 Strengthen international and regional security 
 Shape the future force18 
Figure 1 demonstrates the links between the national military objectives, 
outlined by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the combination of other 
national level documents, which are then compiled by the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense into a single classified document called the Guidance for Employment 
of the Force (GEF).  
                                            
17 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), The National Military Strategy of the United 
States: Redefining America’s Military Leadership (Washington, DC: CJCS, 2011), I. 
18 Ibid., 4. 
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Figure 1.  Security Cooperation Guidance Flow,  
after Moroney et al., 2009, 32.  
The GEF helps the DOD consolidate and integrate several separate 
guidance documents into a single strategic directive.19 It provides the “what” that 
helps bridge the connection from strategy to operations; it does this in part by 
incorporating specific guidance for security cooperation, deliberate planning, 
global posture, global force management, and nuclear weapons planning.20 The 
GEF also directs the combatant commanders to create campaign plans to 
achieve theater and functional strategic end states; in doing so it provides 
combatant commands with:  
                                            
19 Patrick C. Sweeny, “A Primer for: Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), Joint 
Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) System, and 
Global Force Management (GFM)” (Newport, RI: U.S. Navy, 2011), 1. 
20 Ibid. 
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DOD global prioritized end states as well as theater strategic or functional 
strategic end states for campaign planning 
 Strategic assumptions 
 Prioritized deliberate planning scenarios and end states 
 Global posture and global force management guidance 
 Security Cooperation priorities 
 Overarching DOD and U.S. nuclear policy.21 
 Within the GEF, guidance on campaign planning for priorities, countries, 
and individuals is divided into the following categories: critical partners, key 
supporting partners, and actors of concern (see Table 1).22 
  
                                            





1. Countries or organizations that are direct recipients of U.S. security 
cooperation resources 
2. Cannot achieve one or more end states without engagement 
3. Reflect a deliberately select group of countries or organizations 
4. May be current relationships or desired future relationship 
5. Partnerships must be pursued during the life of this guidance in the next two 
years 
 
Key Supporting Partners: 
1. Countries or organizations that assist a command in achieving one or more 
end states 
2. May or may not be from the region in question 
3. Provides capabilities that compliment or supplement U.S. capabilities 
 
Actors of Concern: 
1. Countries or non-state actors who may or may not be potential adversaries 
2. Could be from outside the Area of Responsibility 
3. Security cooperation and “Phase 0” activities designed to assist with problems 
or influence behavior, counter negative influence, or set the conditions for 
operational success 
4. Must pose a problem to a region in a direct and immediate way 
 
Table 1.   GEF Groupings of Countries / Organizations, from 
Sweeney 2011, 3. 
The GEF typically associates a desired end state within a specific country 
with how it is categorized; in some cases, a country can be categorized as both a 
critical partner as well as an actor of concern. 
In addition to the GEF, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) 
provides guidance to the combatant commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 
how to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capability.23  
Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy (USD-P) is the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of 
Defense on policy, which includes oversight on all security cooperation 
programs. Security cooperation is defined as: 
                                            
23 Ibid., 4. 
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All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense 
establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security 
interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and 
multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and 
contingency access to a host nation.24 
The USD-P works closely with other U.S. agencies to ensure defense 
policy and programs related to security cooperation are coordinated.  
Under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD-P), 
the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict 
(ASD/SOLIC) is the principal civilian advisor to the SECDEF on special 
operations and low-intensity conflict matters. “The ASD (SO/LIC) has as his 
principal duty overall supervision (to include oversight of policy and resources) of 
special operations and low-intensity conflict activities.”25 
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is a defense agency 
within the OUSD-P that is tasked to “lead, resource, and educate the Defense 
Security Cooperation community to shape, refine, and execute innovative 
security solutions for partners in support of U.S. interests.”26 The DSCA also 
works closely with the interagency and serves as the focal point between the 
DOD and industry for foreign military sales and other security assistance 
programs.27 DSCA also manages a number of DOD security cooperation 
programs such as building partner capacity and humanitarian assistance as well 
as demining assistance.28 
                                            
24 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), JP1–02: Department of Defense Dictionary 
of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: CJCS, 2014), 235. 
25 Office of the Secretary of Defense, accessed 8 April 2014, 
http://policy.defense.gov/OUSDPOffices/ASDforSpecialOperationsLowIntensityConflict.aspx.  
26 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, accessed 8 April 2014, http://www.dsca.mil/about-
us/mission. 





B. THEATER LEVEL 
The combatant commands (CCMD) are established by the Unified 
Command Plan (UCP), a classified executive branch document prepared by the 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and reviewed and updated every two years. 
The UCP assigns geographic areas of responsibility to the CCMDs in addition to 
planning, training, and operational responsibilities.29 In the process of developing 
theater level security cooperation plans, CCMD planners review six main 
documents: The National Security Strategy; The National Defense Strategy; The 
National Military Strategy; Strategic Planning Guidance, the Quadrennial 
Defense Review, and the OSD Security Cooperation Guidance.30 From this 
process, CCMDs prepare three main types of plans: 
 Campaign plans 
 Contingency plans (top-priority and lesser priority) 
 Functional plans (usually plans which are common to all combatant 
commands or commander-directed plans).31  
There are generally two categories of campaign plans: global or functional 
campaigns, and theater campaigns. Each of the six Geographic Combatant 
Commands (GCCs)—North, South, Europe, Pacific, Africa, and Central—
develops theater campaign plans while a functional combatant command like the 
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has a functional responsibility 
that spans world-wide. For example, USSOCOM is the lead CCMD for 
synchronizing DOD planning to combat terrorists and their networks on a global 
basis, but also support the GCC’s with Special Operations Forces.32  
                                            
29 Andrew Feickert, The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background 
and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), ii. 
30 Jennifer D.P. Moroney et al., A Capabilities-Based Strategy for Army Security 
Cooperation, RAND Report MG-563-A (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), 7. 
31 Plans common to all combatant commands could be Humanitarian/Disaster Response 
(HA/DR) or Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). 
32  Feickert, Unified Command Plan, 15.  
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Once approved, the operational level plans developed at the CCMDs are 
then generally categorized into Operation Plans (OPLAN) or Concept Plans 
(CONPLAN). An OPLAN is the most in depth and is defined as “a complete and 
detailed joint plan containing a full description of the concept of operations, all 
annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment data.”33 
CONPLANS are less detailed than an OPLAN; JP 1–02 defines CONPLANS as 
“an operation plan in an abbreviated format that may require considerable 
expansion or alteration to convert it into a complete operation plan or operation 
order.”34  
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between an approved OPLAN with an 
operations order (OPORD) and the planned phases of an operation as defined 
by JP 5–0: Joint Operational Planning. Significant DOD security cooperation 
activities and military engagements are routinely conducted worldwide during 
peacetime “Phase 0” (shaping) through the GCC’s theater campaign plans.35 
  
                                            
33 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), JP1–02: Department of Defense Dictionary 
of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: CJCS, 2014), 197. 
34 Ibid., 51. 
35 Department of Defense, Security Force Assistance, Joint Doctrine Note 1–13 
(Washington, DC: DOD, 29 April 2013), I-6. 
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Figure 2.  Notional Operation Plan Phases, from JP 5–0: Joint 
Operational Planning 2011, III-39. 
As part of the planning process for theater campaign plans, CCMD 
planners must determine the force requirements necessary for the execution of 
planned and contingency operations. The Global Force Management 
Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) prepared by the Joint Staff and approved by 
the Secretary of Defense provides the framework for assignment, apportionment, 
and allocation of forces.36 Figure 3 illustrates the GFMIG process as the 
Combatant Commands develop force requirements, which are filled by the joint 
force providers. For example, when Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) develops 
a theater campaign plan that calls for the use of Special Operations Forces to 
                                            
36 Sweeny, A Primer, 16. 
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train, advise, and assist a partner nation military force, the subordinate Theater 
Special Operations Command (TSOC), in this case Special Operations 
Command-SOUTH, submits a request to the Joint Staff, which then staffs the 
request with the joint force providers (in this case USSOCOM) to provide the 
resources to conduct the mission. 
 
Figure 3.  Global Force Management Process, from Introduction to 
Global Force Management 5 April 2014. 
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C. SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE 
One of the subsets of the Department of Defense’s security cooperation 
mission is Security Force Assistance (SFA), which Joint Doctrine Note 1–13 
defines as: 
The set of Department of Defense (DOD) activities that contribute 
to unified action by the United States Government (USG) to support 
the development of capability and capacity of foreign security 
forces (FSF) and supporting institutions. FSF are all organizations 
and personnel under host nation (HN) control that have a mission 
of protecting the HN’s sovereignty from internal as well as external 
threats. SFA activities are primarily used to assist an HN in 
defending against internal and transnational threats to stability (i.e., 
supporting foreign internal defense [FID], counterterrorism, 
counterinsurgency [COIN], or stability operations).37 
As a combatant command, USSOCOM views SFA as one of its many 
missions and it is integrated within one of the command’s four major lines of 
operation, “Expand the global SOF partnership.”38  Joint Publication 3–05 
“Special Operations” provides the following guidance on the relationship between 
the conduct of SFA and USSOCOM: 
USSOCOM is the designated joint proponent for SFA, with 
responsibility to lead the collaborative development, coordination, 
and integration of the SFA capability across DOD. This includes 
development of SFA joint doctrine; training and education for 
individuals and units; joint capabilities; joint mission essential task 
lists; and identification of critical individual skills, training, and 
experience. Additionally, in collaboration with the Joint Staff…and 
in coordination with the Services and GCCs, USSOCOM is tasked 
with developing global joint sourcing solutions that recommend the 
most appropriate forces (CF and/or SOF) for a SFA mission.39 
                                            
37 Department of Defense, Security Force Assistance, Joint Doctrine Note 1–13 
(Washington, DC: DOD, 29 April 2013), I–1. 
38 USSOCOM, Fact Book 2014, accessed 5 April 2014, 
http://www.socom.mil/News/Documents/USSOCOM_Fact_Book_2014.pdf. 
39 Department of Defense, Security Force Assistance, Joint Doctrine Note 1–13 
(Washington, DC: DOD, 29 April 2013), II-12–13. 
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While USSOCOM is a combatant command, its forces are “normally under 
operational control of the commander, theater special operations commander, or 
a commander, special operations component command, who has primary 
responsibility to plan and supervise the execution of special operations in support 
of the GCC or a subordinate Joint Force Commander, respectively.” 40 Figure 4 
provides an illustration of the stakeholders involved in SFA and the complex 
coordination relationships between the different entities.  
 
 
Figure 4.  Security Forces Assistance Coordination, from JDN 1–13: 
Security Force Assistance 29 April 2013, II-3. 
                                            
40 Ibid., I-13. 
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D. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
In contrast to the DOD, which is mainly focused on security, the 
Department of State (DOS) is the lead U.S. foreign affairs agency within the 
executive branch and the main institution for the conduct of American 
diplomacy.41 The mission of the DOS is to “shape and sustain a peaceful, 
prosperous, just, and democratic world and foster conditions for stability and 
progress for the benefit of the American people and people everywhere.”42 The 
DOS does not follow the same planning process as the DOD, which is required 
to conduct a Quadrennial Defense Review every four years. However, Secretary 
of State Clinton, while in office, implemented the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and 
Development Review, which implements foreign policy guidance down to the 
regional level and is loosely equivalent to the GCC’s theater campaign plans. 
The DOS’s security assistance program sits at the intersection of security 
and diplomacy. Security assistance is defined as:  
A group of programs…by which the U.S. provides defense articles, 
military training, and other defense-related services to foreign 
nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of 
national policies and objectives.43 
There are three main offices within the DOS that deal with security 
assistance: The Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control & International 
Security Affairs; the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (USAID); and the 
Ambassadors or Chief, U.S. Diplomatic Mission (COM) for each country. The 
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs “leads the 
interagency policy process on nonproliferation and manages global U.S. security 
                                            
41 Department of State, Strategic Plan FY14–17 (Washington, DC: DoS, 2014), 6. 
42 Department of State, accessed, 5 April 2014 
http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/index.htm#mission. 
43 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), JP1–02: Department of Defense Dictionary 
of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: CJCS, 2014), 234. 
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policy, principally in the areas of nonproliferation, arms control, regional security 
and defense relations, and arms transfers and security assistance.”44  
Within the Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International 
Security Affairs, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs is the principle link 
between DOS and DOD and provides policy direction in the areas of international 
security, security assistance, military operations, defense strategy and plans, and 
defense trade.45 The Office of Security Assistance directs over $6 billion annually 
in U.S. military grant assistance to ally countries through policy development, 
budget formulation, and program oversight.46 
USAID is the lead U.S. government agency that works to end extreme 
global poverty and enable resilient, democratic societies to realize their 
potential.47 While USAID mainly focuses on economic development, many times 
these efforts can overlap as part of a whole-of-government approach to 
development and security sector reform. 
The Under Secretary for Political Affairs serves as the day-to-day 
manager of overall regional and bilateral policy issues, and oversees the seven 
regional bureaus that manage the 270 U.S. embassies, consulates, and 
diplomatic missions throughout the world. In each embassy, the Chief of Mission 
(usually an ambassador appointed by the president) is responsible for executing 
U.S. foreign policy goals and for coordinating and managing all U.S. government 
functions in the host country.48  
Each embassy typically has a Senior Defense Official (SDO) or Defense 
Attaché (DATT) who works with the ambassador as the principle DOD official as 
designated by the SECDEF. DOD Directive 5132.03: “DOD Policy and 
                                            
44 Department of State, accessed 5 April 2014, http://www.state.gov/t/index.htm. 
45 Department of State, accessed 5 April 2014, http://www.state.gov/t/pm/index.htm. 
46 Department of State, accessed 5 April 2014, http://www.state.gov/t/pm/sa/index.htm. 
47 USAID, accessed 5 April 2014, http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do. 
48 Department of State, Strategic Plan FY14–17, (Washington, DC: DoS, 2014), 7. 
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Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation” defines the SDO or DATT as 
“the principle military advisor on defense and national security issues, the senior 
diplomatically DOD military officer assigned to the diplomatic mission, and the 
single point of contact for all DOD matters involving the embassy or DOD 
assigned to or working from the embassy.”49  
In addition to the Office of the Defense Attaché, a Security Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) manages the security cooperation programs in the host 
country. The SCO, in coordination with the embassy country team, develops 
country plans that provide the roadmap of specific engagement activities that a 
GCC intends to conduct from one-to-three years.50 These activities include day-
to-day presence missions, military-to-military exchanges, and combined 
exercises. The plan provides guidance to service components and other DOD 
planners, which inform and are informed by both the COM’s integrated country 
strategy and, if applicable, USAID country development strategy. 51  
Figure 5 shows the organization of the U.S. government for security 
cooperation and security assistance. Of particular note are the points of 
intersection between the DOS and DOD, and the multiple agencies involved in 
implementing security assistance.  
                                            
49 Department of Defense, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security 
Cooperation, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5132.03 (Washington, DC: DOD, 24 
October 2008), 11. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Joint Doctrine Note 1–13, III-1. 
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Figure 5.  U.S. Government Organization for Security Cooperation and 
Security Assistance. From The Management of Security 







This chapter has provided a brief overview of the policies and agencies 
responsible for security cooperation and security assistance. Specifically, it 
demonstrates the complexity of the system and highlights the major agencies 
from the President to the country team that are involved in planning, resourcing, 
and executing U.S. foreign policy and the mechanisms used to implement it.  
The next chapter outlines a tool developed by the RAND Corporation to 
assist in selecting partner nations to build partner capacity as part of a security 
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III. RAND TOOLS FOR ASSESSING BUILDING  
PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY 
Security cooperation across the DOD is a diverse and complex set of 
programs, the effort of which spans the globe and varies by combatant 
command; this diversity in geographic region and country creates a particular 
challenge in developing an analytic tool to compare efforts across the range of 
partner countries. Ideally planners would be able to measure security 
cooperation efforts and outcomes across the theater of operations or even 
globally in order to make policy and operational recommendations; however, no 
such tools exist.  
In 2013, the RAND Corporation conducted a study that asked the 
question: “How can the DOD increase the effectiveness of its efforts to build 
partner capacity while also increasing the efficiency of those efforts?”52 This 
chapter will look at the data, evidence, and findings from this report as well as the 
follow on report, which developed a tool to serve as a preliminary diagnostic 
assessment of security cooperation efforts to augment the challenges of 
individual subject matter expert-based assessments.53 This assessment tool will 
then be used in Chapter IV to assess SOF efforts at building partnership 
capacity. 
A. WHAT WORKS BEST WHEN BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY AND 
UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES? 
1. Data 
Due to the sensitivity of the some of the details of the partnerships 
involved in the case studies the actual partners were not listed, while the case 
studies in the full controlled-access companion report were reviewed, none of the 
                                            
52 Christopher Paul et al., What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under 
What Circumstances? RAND Report MG-1253/1-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), xiii. 
53 Christopher Paul et al., The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity 
Matching Tool, RAND Report TL-112-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2013), 1–2. 
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data is included in this thesis. For access to the full case studies including the list 
of 29 countries selected, contact the RAND Corporation. 
The RAND report considers and compares 29 historical case studies of 
U.S. efforts to build partner capacity since the Cold War.54 This research design 
allows for twenty years of data to be collected under different conditions and 
contexts.55 Each country case study is divided into two, three, or four 
chronological phases, which then act as units of analysis.56 The report notes that 
the average length of a phase is eight years.57 Analysts determined phases by 
significant shifts and events affecting many factors in an overall case; some 
examples include a regional war, changes in U.S. priorities, or a crisis inside the 
partner nation or its government.58 Once compiled, the total number of phases 
equals 100; this includes the null phases where no building capacity occurred, 
the actual data phases, and a baseline phase.59 Of the 100 phases, 38 are null or 
baseline, and 62 are “real” phases in which the United States conducted building 
partner capacity activities with discernable intent.60  In 55 of those 62 phases, “at 
least one of the primary objectives was a form of capacity building—that is, 
relationship building or securing access was not the only primary objective, and 
efforts included some kind of earnest attempt to build actual capacity.”61 Figure 6 
is the RAND Venn diagram of the subsets of the 62 non-null phases.62 
                                            




58 Ibid., 47. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid, xiv–xv. 
62 Ibid., xvi. 
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Figure 6.  Venn Diagram of the Subset of Phases in the Data,  
from Paul et al., 2013, 55. 
2. Findings 
Building partner capacity (BPC) is complex; however, the report finds that 
there are clearly some best practices for the conduct of BPC, and useful traits for 
desirable partners.63 The analysis from the report produces the following findings: 
1. Matching matters: BPC is most effective when U.S. objectives 
align with partner-nation objectives and when BPC efforts align with 
the partner’s baseline capabilities and absorptive capacity.64 
The cases show that BPC is effective “when the capacity being built meets 
the interests of both the partner country and the United States and when the BPC 
activities are a good match for the partner’s baseline capacity in the that area 
                                            
63 Ibid., xviii 
64 Ibid., xvii. 
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and its capacity to absorb new materiel, training, and so on.”65 One example of 
this is Mexico; between 1996–1999 U.S. special forces trained approximately 
3,200 personnel in rapid response operations. Additionally, during the same time 
period, the attendance of Mexican airmen at the Inter-American Air Forces 
Academy increased from 141 to 331.66 As a result, around 1998 the U.S. and 
Mexico began “forming a shared understanding of the severity of the threat in 
Mexico,” which led to more effective partnering on a range of issues, especially 
counternarcotics.67 
2. Context matters: Certain characteristics or features of PNs make 
BPC more likely to be effective.68  
Specifically, the following properties are associated with greater 
effectiveness in BPC: 
 PN invests its own funds to support or sustain capacity  
 PN has sufficient absorptive capacity; 
 PN has high governance indicators; 
 PN has a strong economy; 
 PN shares security interests with the United States.69 
3. Independent of PN context, there are several factors under the 
control of the United States that correlate strongly with BPC 
effectiveness.70 
These factors include:  
 Spending more money on BPC or undertaking more BPC 
initiatives; 
                                            
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., 68. 
67 Ibid. 




 Consistency in both the funding and implementation of these 
initiatives; 
 Matching BPC efforts with PN objectives and absorptive 
capacity;  
 Including a sustainment component in the initiatives.71 
The results demonstrate that when all three principles are followed, 
building partnership capacity has been effective. In other words, “if BPC is 
consistently funded and delivered, supported and sustained, well matched to 
partner capabilities and interests, and shared with a partner that supports the 
efforts, has a healthy economy and government, prospects for effective BPC are 
very good.”72  The findings also suggest that “BPC can still be effective when 
only some of the practices are followed or when only some of the conditions are 
met.”73 However, the “strongest and most consistent correlations” are for “factors 
at the seams of U.S. and partner nation control”; that is to say, the factors not 
specifically under the control of one or the other but rather the factors related to 
“the alignment of interests and the matching of capacity building activities to 
partner objectives and to the ability of the partner nation to absorb and retain the 
materiel and training provided.”74 
3. Recommendations 
The study’s findings suggest several recommendations for future planning 
and execution of BPC, and in investing in the creation and maintenance of BPC 
capabilities.75 
 
                                            
71 Ibid. 





1. Where possible, choose partners that have or can adopt the 
attributes, characteristics, or behaviors that are associated with 
effective BPC.76 
The study acknowledges that certain partners are chosen to meet policy 
objectives or counter specific threats; however, when there is flexibility in 
choosing a partner the factors of effective BPC should be considered.77 
Specifically, when all else is equal, give preference to countries that:  
 Are willing to invest their own funds to support or sustain capacity; 
 Have sufficient absorptive capacity; 
 Have governance indicators; 
 Have strong and healthy economies; 
 Have broad strategic interests predominately align with U.S. 
interests in the region.78 
2. Regardless of the partner or context, choose BPC goals and 
activities to correspond with what the partner wants or needs and 
what it is capable of absorbing.79 
3. For continued BPC effectiveness, the United States should build 
or maintain partner capabilities in the following ways: 
Plan BPC activities to match both U.S. and PN needs and 
objectives; 
Identify baseline PN absorptive capacity and match BPC activities 
to what the partner can absorb; 
Build ministerial capacity and develop absorptive capacity in 
general; 
Consider sustainment capabilities.80 
                                            
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid., xix. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid, xix–xx. 
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B. THE RAND SECURITY COOPERATION PRIORITIZATION AND 
PROPENSITY MATCHING TOOL  
Building on the previous RAND study, the “matching tool” is a diagnostic 
tool built in Microsoft Excel that aims to assist planners during preliminary stages, 
identify mismatches between the country and U.S. interests, propose U.S. 
security cooperation funding to that country, and predict the propensity for 
successful U.S. security cooperation with that country.81  
Traditionally, efforts to evaluate likely benefits relative to priorities for 
security cooperation have taken place at the country level and have depended 
almost entirely on individual country subject-matter experts (SMEs).82 These 
SME assessments often suffer from shortcomings, including a lack of 
comparability across countries, an absence of impartiality, and inconsistencies in 
the level of expertise of the SME.83  
As a potential solution to these issues, the “matching tool” produces an 
overall security propensity score for each of the world’s 195 countries; these 
scores can then be compared with U.S security cooperation funding levels and 
country prioritization.84  
The “matching tool” builds on the findings of the RAND report, What 
Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstance; it 
takes nine specific and measurable factors that individually correlate with BPC 
success and scores them in a binary fashion: 0 = absent, 1 = present.85  
The first four factors are under U.S. control: 
1. Spending more money on BPC or undertaking more BPC 
initiatives; 
                                            
81 Christopher Paul et al., The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity 
Matching Tool, RAND Report TL-112-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2013), x. 
82 Ibid., 1. 
83 Ibid., 1–2. 
84 Ibid., x–xi. 
85 Ibid., 8. 
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2. Ensuring consistency in both the funding and implementation of 
these initiatives; 
3. Matching BPC efforts with PN objectives and absorptive capacity; 
4. Including a sustainment component in the initiatives86 
The second four factors are characteristics of the partner or are under PN 
control: 
5. PN invests its own funds; 
6. PN has sufficient absorptive capacity; 
7. PN has high governance indicators; 
8. PN has a strong economy.87  
One factor is shared between the United States and the PN: 
9. PN shares a broad security interests with the United States.88 
Figure 7 summarizes the 29 case studies in a table and shows the strong 
correlation between the individual nine factors and BPC success; additionally the 
sum is also a relatively strong predictor of BPC in the latest phase of the case.89  
                                            
86 Ibid., x. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid., 8. 
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Figure 7.  Summary of Case Studies, Factors, and BPC Effectiveness, 
from Paul et al., 2013, 9. 
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The results from Figure 7 led the researchers to ask two questions that 
motivated their research effort: 
 Which of the rest of the countries in the world have pattern of 
factors that correspond with success in historical cases? 
 Which other factors can be identified in the literature that might 
contribute to propensity for success?90 
After reviewing the literature the research team developed approximately 
70 hypotheses, which were further refined into 27 constructs.91 Each associated 
construct has an associated weight, representing the strength of the contribution 
of that construct to the propensity for effective security cooperation and the 
strength of the research contributing to that construct.92 The 27 constructs were 
then further grouped into ten categories as shown in Table 2.93 
  
                                            
90 Ibid. 




CATEGORY 1. HISTORICAL QUALITY OF U.S. SC/SFA/BPC PROVISION 
SC is more likely to be effective when the U.S. provides an adequate amount of consistent SC funding to the 
PN 
Construct 1.1: U.S. SC/SFA/BPC funding consistent 
Construct 1.2: U.S. SC/SFA/BPC funding sufficient
CATEGORY 2. HISTORICAL TRACK RECORD OF SUCCESS WITH PN 
SC is more likely to be effective with a PN that has successfully implemented and sustained U.S. or other 
foreign assistance in the past 
Construct 2.1: U.S. historical success with SC/BPA/SFA 
Construct 2.2: Historical success with foreign aid
CATEGORY 3. U.S.-PN RELATIONSHIP 
SC is more likely to be effective when the U.S. and PN have a long-term relationship built on shared interests 
and a history of cooperation and where the U.S. is viewed favorably by the PN 
Construct 3.1: PN cooperation with U.S. 
Construct 3.2: PN citizen perception of U.S. 
Construct 3.3: Long-term relationship between U.S. and PN 
Construct 3.4: Shared interests between U.S. and PN
CATEGORY 4. SUPPORT FOR MILITARY IN/BY THE PN 
SC is more likely to be successful when the PN government and public support the military 
Construct 4.1: PN government invests in military 
Construct 4.2: PN public support for military
CATEGORY 5. ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY OF PN MILITARY 
SC is more likely to be successful when the PN military has sufficient capacity to absorb the SC being 
provided 
Construct 5.1: PN military forces’ absorptive capacity 
Construct 5.2: PN absorptive capacity—technical 
Construct 5.3: PN absorptive capacity—ministerial
CATEGORY 6. STRENGTH OF PN GOVERNMENT 
SC is more likely to be successful when the PN government has competent and strong institutions 
Construct 6.1: PN government competence/strength 
CATEGORY 7. PN GOVERNANCE 
SC is more likely to be successful with PNs that have good governments that are stable, not corrupt, and 
accountable to their people 
Construct 7.1: PN democratic 
Construct 7.2: PN government stability 
Construct 7.3: PN government legitimacy 
Construct 7.4: PN governance 
Construct 7.5: Lack of PN government corruption 
Construct 7.6: PN human rights record
CATEGORY 8. PN ECONOMIC STRENGTH 
SC is more likely to be effective with PNs with stable economies and a minimum level of economic 
development 
Construct 8.1: PN economy 
CATEGORY 9. PN SECURITY SITUATION 
SC is more likely to be successful in PNs without internal stability or other serious threats (though these may 
increase their need for SC) 
Construct 9.1: PN security 
CATEGORY 10. PRACTICAL EASE OF ENGAGING WITH PN 
SC is more likely to be successful with PNs that are easier to work with because they are small, speak 
English, have good infrastructure, and have signed all necessary agreements with the U.S. 
Construct 10.1: U.S.-PN agreements—information sharing 
Construct 10.2: U.S.-PN agreements—legal status of forces 
Construct 10.3: U.S.-PN common language 
Construct 10.4: PN transportation infrastructure 
Construct 10.5: PN communication infrastructure
Table 2.   Tool Categories and Constructs,  




In populating the tool with data, a system of measures or proxies was 
developed; each of the 27 constructs is represented by one or more measures or 
proxies.94 For example, Construct 4.1, “PN government invests in military” is 
represented by multiple measures: a combination of total PN military spending 
per capita and total military budget as a percentage of gross domestic product 
(GDP).95 Each measure comes from an accessible database with global or nearly 
global coverage.96 The researchers used a variety of sources, including the Word 
Bank, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, United Nations, Center for Systemic 
Peace, Gallup, and Jane’s, as well as U.S. government agencies, including the 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, and the 
Department of Homeland Security.97 
The system developed to weigh the measures as a proxy for the construct 
included a weighted system, performed by the analyst, to approximate how 
reliable and valid the data sources are, and how closely the measure mirrored 
the construct.98 For example, the absorptive capacity of a country’s military, while 
very important, is also very hard to measure.99 The research team therefore used 
a scale of 0 to 1, where 1 would be assigned to a measure that perfectly 
represented the construct and 0 would indicate no representation whatsoever. 
Interestingly, for absorptive capacity of the PNs military, the RAND team did not 
find any measures above 0.4.100 
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The report calculated constructs weights based on five factors: (1) the 
overall proxy weight of the measures (the RAND team assessment of how well 
the measures represent the construct), (2) the strength of the correlation 
between the construct and the effectiveness of security cooperation, (3) the 
quality of the research supporting the construct, (4) the number of research 
studies supporting the construct, and (5) the extent to which the construct is 
duplicative or overlaps with other constructs.101 The second and third factors 
came out of the initial literature review, the fourth was recorded during the 
hypothesis-sifting process, and the first and fifth are based on the RAND team’s 
holistic assessment.102 The construct scores and weights are combined to 
provide the overall propensity score for each country as well as the individual 
category scores.103 Of note, the categories themselves have no inherent weight 
and are just a means of displaying similar constructs in a manageable format.104 
Figure 8 is a screenshot of the “Top Sheet” spreadsheet in Microsoft Excel. 
The “Top Sheet” spreadsheet lists the 195 countries recognized by the 
U.S Department of State. These countries can be sorted using six different filters: 
country, CCMD, overall score, priority, SC/SFA/BPC expenditures, and 
SC/SFA/BPC expenditures by PN troop. These categories help the user compare 
individual countries as well as the overall CCMD’s. In addition to these filters, the 
user can also sort the countries by any of the ten factors discussed in the 




                                            
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid., 18–19. 
104 Ibid., 19. 
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The workbook also contains sheets with explanations of the data tables, 
the source, and calculation data. The last sheet, “Category Construct Weights” 
provides defaults weights for the categories and constructs as determined by the 
authors however, the user can choose to input new weights to meet their criteria. 
At the bottom of the sheet each of the ten categories are assigned a normalized 
weight that sum to 1. Therefore, each normalized category weight represents its 





Figure 8.  Screenshot of “Top Sheet” Spreadsheet, from The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and 
Propensity Matching Tool.  
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In conclusion, the two reports have provided an analytical approach to 
building best practices when it comes to security cooperation efforts to build 
partner capacity. The first report, “What Works Best…” laid the groundwork 
through rigorous analysis of case studies to determine the conditions required for 
successful capacity building efforts while the second report, “The RAND Security 
Cooperation Prioritization…Tool” took the conclusions from the first report and 
applied them to countries around the world. 
In the following chapter, these reports will serve as a tool to gauge SOF 
efforts to build capacity as part of the various CCMD’s theater campaign plans. It 
will look at the current efforts by the Theater Special Operations Commands and 





IV. ANALYSIS  
The Office of the Secretary of Defense commissioned the RAND 
Corporation to develop the Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity 
Matching Tool as a “diagnostic tool…that will help DOD decision makers 
preliminarily identify mismatches between the importance of a country to U.S. 
interests, U.S. security cooperation funding to that country, and the propensity for 
successful U.S. security cooperation with that country.”105 Furthermore, the tool 
aims to be “a preliminary diagnostic device that has the virtues of being 
systematic, being based on global data, and not relying on objective 
assessment.”106 These goals suggest that this tool could serve a valuable role in 
selecting appropriate partner nations with which to build capacity and improve 
U.S. foreign policy and national security.  
However, the authors of the tool do advise that it comes with limitations; it 
is not a substitute for strategic thought and its designed purpose is to highlight 
any potential mismatches that may exist so that they can be further studied.107 
This observation is particularly relevant when considering countries that may be 
of high priority for national security, but do not score high on the criteria that the 
RAND tool believes will facilitate the building of partnership capacity.  
Chapter II illustrated the complex system that makes up the security 
cooperation environment in which the National Security Council advises the 
President and coordinates policy. Due to several factors—low signature, cheaper 
cost, language and cultural capability—Special Operation Forces tend to be a 
part of the overall means by which security cooperation policy objectives are 
achieved. Recent history provides several examples such as Afghanistan, 
Colombia, and the Philippines where SOF were called upon to build partner 
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nation capacity. As discussed, the definition of special operations are operations 
characterized as containing one or more of the following: “time sensitive, 
clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, 
requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk.”108 While many 
capacity building efforts may not require the employ of special operation forces, 
recent history provides several examples such as Afghanistan, Colombia, and 
the Philippines where SOF were called upon to build partner nation capacity. 
This chapter examines several areas where the findings and 
recommendations from the RAND report and the associated “matching tool” 
could be applicable to better match SOF efforts with building partnership 
capacity. The first part of the chapter contains general observations and trends 
from the data and how they relate to the employment of SOF around the globe. 
The second part of the chapter looks at implications for theater campaign 
planning at the Combatant Command (CCMD) and Theater Special Operations 
Command (TSOCs) where SOF would be considered a part of a capacity 
building effort.  
A. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND TRENDS 
Observation #1 
The first and most compelling observation from the “matching tool” is that 
the countries with the greatest propensity for successful capacity building are 
ones that do not pose dire security concerns to the United States. Conversely, 
there is a considerable correlation between low overall scores for successful 
capacity building and countries that present a security challenge for the United 
States and need capacity building in their security forces. 
The majority of countries that the RAND tool identifies as having the 
greatest propensity for success fall within the EUCOM area of responsibility. 
They are developed democracies with good governance indicators and stable 
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economies. Many of these countries, such as Denmark, Norway, and the 
Netherlands, are also members of NATO and have contributed to efforts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.109  
These results suggest that the greatest propensity for success in building 
partner capacity would be countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and 
Canada, all of which are allies of the U.S. The current debate over capacity 
building does not generally include these countries, but rather countries that are 
considered failed states or lack the capacity to provide certain security functions, 
mainly counterterrorism, within their country. Most of the security cooperation 
efforts with the higher scoring countries involve building interoperability, usually 
through bilateral or combined exercises, exchanges, and information sharing.110  
Observation #2 
In 13 of the top 20 countries receiving U.S. SC/SFA/BPC expenditures 
(see Table 3), SOF contributed to the effort. This corroborates previous historical 
observations indicating that SOF units are often employed as part of larger 
SC/SFA/BC efforts. Some of the more recent and most notable examples include 
SOF’s continuous presence in Afghanistan since 2001 while working with the 
Afghan Security Forces to build their special operations capabilities, SOF 
operations with Iraq special operations units during Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
SOF’s work with the Colombian military to develop their special operations 
capabilities against the FARC, and SOF operations in the Philippines to assist 
the Philippine military in combating Islamic terrorist groups.  
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Table 3.   FY10 Total SC/SFA/BPC Expenditures from The 
RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and 
Propensity Matching Tool. 
Policy makers may choose to employ SOF in capacity-building missions 
for a variety of reasons; however, it is often the case that they are better suited 
for the mission due to their smaller footprint and unique capabilities and 
experience in areas such as language capability, area and cultural orientation, 
and ability to work with indigenous populations. While expenditure figures do not 
account for all the nuanced variables that go into policy decision, it is interesting 
to note that the top twenty countries accounted in Fiscal Year 2010 for $17.1B of 
the $17.5B in SC/SFA/BC expenditure, with Afghanistan receiving the 
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Observation #3 
There is a strong correlation between the absorptive capacity of the 
military and the overall score presented in the RAND tool, which also includes 
political and economic factors. While not exclusive, the general trend indicates 
the higher the absorptive capacity of the partner nation military, the higher the 
propensity for successful capacity building. 
In reviewing the RAND tool’s ten categories, six (categories 4–9) are 
directly tied to the partner nation’s military, population, and government. When 
considering the four elements of national power—Diplomatic, Informational, 
Military, and Economic—building military capacity alone, including SOF capacity, 
as a means of influencing a partner nation’s population and government could be 
challenging.  
Category 9, “partner nation security situation,” would be a more 
manageable military effort for SOF; however this variable most likely will require 
prolonged efforts, such as counterinsurgency or foreign internal defense, and 
necessitate large-scale mobilization. These efforts may also require the 
deployment of international peace keeping or counter-insurgency forces in order 
to improve the partner nation’s security, which is costly, time consuming and may 
not be in line with the administration’s national security strategy. A good example 
of this is the 2011 overthrow of Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya; with wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Obama Administration was reluctant to put more 
ground troops into a situation that may require another sustained effort to 
stabilize the security situation. Instead, the U.S. elected to provide air support 
and partner with NATO allies in assisting opposition forces in removing the 
dictator and eventually electing the National Transitional Council.112   
 
                                            




The tenth category, “practical ease of engaging with the partner nation,” is 
based on several factors such as legal agreements and infrastructure that 
generally fall under the purview of the Department of State or other agencies, 
and are not typically considered part of the DOD mission or military objectives. 
Moreover, the RAND tool prioritizes this as the second least weighted category 
within its overall score at only 3%. Therefore, although it may be easier to build 
capacity with countries that have a common language or have standing legal 
agreements with the U.S., this should not be a heavily weighted factor for SOF 
when choosing partners.   
In Category 5, the last remaining category, “partner nation absorptive 
capacity” may be the most recognizable and measureable factor for SOF when 
planning security cooperation efforts to build partner capacity. Category 5 is 
based on the finding that “security cooperation works best when the military has 
the sufficient capacity to absorb the security cooperation being provided.”113 
However, the authors of the RAND matching tool are quick to note that this 
category should not be taken as an independent variable and should not be used 
as the sole means for determining success. Independent assessment of 
individual units and capabilities by knowledgeable personnel in addition to 
coordination with interagency and security cooperation organizations are critical 
to determining the true absorptive capacity of the partner nation’s military.  
The authors of the RAND matching tool decided to weigh category 5 as 
the fourth highest; they assessed it as 15% of the overall summary propensity 
score, with categories 1,3, and 4 just slightly higher at 16%.114 The authors 
determined the overall score for the partner nation’s military absorptive capacity 
by creating three constructs: 1. Partner nation’s military absorptive capacity, 2. 
Partner nation’s absorptive capacity—technical, and 3. Partner nation’s 
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absorptive capacity—ministerial.115 Table 4 contains the list of the constructs, 
measures, and sources that make up the score for category 5. Future users of 
the RAND tool may choose to develop different constructs or weights to analyze 
different factors applicable to more specific missions. 
 
Construct Measure Source 
5.1 PN military forces’ absorptive capacity 
Category 5 weight: 
58% 
5.1.1 PN military sophistication (EIU) Military Capability and Sophistication Indicator 
(2007–2012) Global Peace Index (GPI), Institute for 
Economics and Peace, and the Economist 
Intelligence Unit, Sydney, Australia 
5.1.2 PN military spending in millions 
constant U.S. $ per troop 
SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, World Bank 
Development Indicator, Total Armed Services 
Personnel 
5.1.3 Efficacy of security forces IHS, Jane’s Country Risk Intelligence Centere 
Module 
5.2 PN absorptive capacity—technical 
Category 5 weight: 
7%  
5.2.1 U.S. patents granted annually to 
PN residents per capita 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), 
Number of Patents Granted as Distributed by Year 
of Patent Grant, PART A1, Table A1–1a, Breakout 
by U.S. State and Country of Origin, Number of 
Patents Granted as Distributed by Year of Patent 
Grant. Granted: 01/01/1963–12/31/2011   
5.2.2 Royalty and license 
fees/payments per GDP 
World Bank, World Development Indicators; original 
source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of 
Payments Statistics Yearbook and data files 
5.2.3 Secondary enrollment ratio World Bank, World Development Indicators; original 
source: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for 
Statistics  
5.2.4 Adult literacy rate World Bank, World Development Indicators; original 
source: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for 
Statistics  
5.2.5 Tertiary enrollment ratio World Bank, World Development Indicators; original 
source: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for 
Statistics  
5.3 PN absorptive capacity—ministerial 
Category 5 weight: 
35% 
5.3.1 WGI Government Effectiveness 
rating 
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 
5.3.2 GDP per capita growth, average 
over past 5 years 
 
World Bank World Development Indicators, derived 
from World Bank national accounts data, and 
OECD National Accounts data files 
5.3.3 State control of security forces IHS, Jane’s Country Risk Intelligence Centre 
Module, December 2011 
5.3.4 Professionalism of security 
forces 
IHS, Jane’s Country Risk Intelligence Centre 
Module, December 2011   
  
     
Table 4.   Data for Category 5: Absorptive Capacity of PN 
Military, from The RAND Security Cooperation 
Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool. 
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B. IMPLICATIONS FOR CCMDS AND TSOCS 
Chapter II illustrated how national security policy directs the combatant 
commands’ efforts in theater campaign planning and security cooperation. The 
RAND matching tool provides some interesting insights and implications for the 
employment of SOF within certain geographic areas and CCMDs countries.  
The RAND tool uses the State Department list of 195 recognized 
countries; the overall scores for countries varied between a low of .12 for 
Somalia and a high of .87 for the United Kingdom. A mean overall score was  
.51 and the COCOMs scored the following: USAFRICOM .38, USCENTCOM .43, 
USSOUTHCOM .50, USPACOM .51, USEUCOM .66, and USNORTHCOM 
.69.116  
Dividing the overall scores into four tiers based on the mean scores, the 
top tier scores range from .88 to .57, the second tier between .56 and .39, the 
third tier between .38 and .20, and the final tier below .19 (see Table 5). The 
distribution of countries across the fours tiers is as follows: Tier 1 (highest score): 
70, Tier 2: 73, Tier 3: 51, and Tier 4: 2.117  73 percent of the countries fell within 
the top two tiers and received an overall score of .39 or better, which suggests 
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# Country or Territory ISO FIPS   COCOM SCORE  
187 United States USA U.S. NORTHCOM 0.88 
186 United Kingdom (Britain) GBR UK EUCOM 0.87 
9 Australia AUS AS PACOM 0.84 
31 Canada CAN CA NORTHCOM 0.84 
47 Denmark DNK DA EUCOM 0.83 
100 Liechtenstein LIE LS EUCOM 0.82 
59 Finland FIN FI EUCOM 0.80 
129 Norway NOR NO EUCOM 0.78 
125 New Zealand NZL NZ PACOM 0.78 
10 Austria AUT AU EUCOM 0.78 
124 Netherlands NLD NL EUCOM 0.78 
81 Israel ISR IS EUCOM 0.78 
80 Ireland IRL EI EUCOM 0.77 
168 Sweden SWE SW EUCOM 0.77 
64 Germany DEU GM EUCOM 0.77 
60 France FRA FR EUCOM 0.76 
4 Andorra ADO AN EUCOM 0.75 
84 Japan JPN JA PACOM 0.75 
90 Korea (Seoul). Republic of Korea KOR KS PACOM 0.75 
15 Barbados BRB BB SOUTHCOM 0.74 
116 Monaco MCO MN EUCOM 0.74 
169 Switzerland CHE SZ EUCOM 0.74 
17 Belgium BEL BE EUCOM 0.73 
102 Luxembourg LUX LU EUCOM 0.72 
149 San Marino SMR SM EUCOM 0.72 
156 Singapore SGP SN PACOM 0.72 
139 Poland POL PL EUCOM 0.72 
158 Slovenia SVN SI EUCOM 0.70 
35 Chile CHL CI SOUTHCOM 0.70 
140 Portugal PRT PO EUCOM 0.70 
163 Spain ESP SP EUCOM 0.70 
109 Malta MLT MT EUCOM 0.70 
157 Slovakia (Slovak Republic) SVK LO EUCOM 0.69 
171 Taiwan 0 TW PACOM 0.69 
56 Estonia EST EN EUCOM 0.69 
43 Croatia HRV HR EUCOM 0.69 
66 Greece GRC GR EUCOM 0.69 
46 Czech Republic CZE EZ EUCOM 0.68 
82 Italy ITA IT EUCOM 0.68 
45 Cyprus CYP CY EUCOM 0.68 
74 Hungary HUN HU EUCOM 0.67 
12 Bahamas BHS BF NORTHCOM 0.67 
75 Iceland ISL IC EUCOM 0.67 
148 Samoa WSM WS PACOM 0.67 
185 United Arab Emirates ARE AE CENTCOM 0.66 
118 Montenegro MNE MJ EUCOM 0.66 
132 Palau PLW PS PACOM 0.65 
188 Uruguay URY UY SOUTHCOM 0.65 
147 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines VCT VC SOUTHCOM 0.65 
101 Lithuania LTU LH EUCOM 0.65 
110 Marshall Islands MHL RM PACOM 0.65 
146 Saint Lucia LCA ST SOUTHCOM 0.62 
95 Latvia LVA LG EUCOM 0.62 
145 Saint Kitts and Nevis KNA SC SOUTHCOM 0.62 
142 Romania ROM RO EUCOM 0.62 
178 Trinidad and Tobago TTO TD SOUTHCOM 0.60 
114 Micronesia FSM FM PACOM 0.60 
26 Bulgaria BGR BU EUCOM 0.60 
141 Qatar QAT QA CENTCOM 0.60 
180 Turkey TUR TU EUCOM 0.59 
153 Serbia (Republic of Serbia) SRB RI EUCOM 0.59 
23 Botswana BWA BC AFRICOM 0.59 
106 Malaysia MYS MY PACOM 0.59 
25 Brunei (Brunei Darussalam) BRN BX PACOM 0.58 
92 Kuwait KWT KU CENTCOM 0.58 
37 Colombia COL CO SOUTHCOM 0.57 
24 Brazil BRA BR SOUTHCOM 0.57 
85 Jordan JOR JO CENTCOM 0.57 
161 South Africa ZAF SF AFRICOM 0.57 
41 Costa Rica CRI CS SOUTHCOM 0.57 
112 Mauritius MUS MP AFRICOM 0.56 
113 Mexico MEX MX NORTHCOM 0.56 
2 Albania ALB AL EUCOM 0.56 
130 Oman OMN MU CENTCOM 0.56 
6 Antigua and Barbuda ATG AC SOUTHCOM 0.56 
151 Saudi Arabia SAU SA CENTCOM 0.56 
67 Grenada GRD GJ SOUTHCOM 0.55 
63 Georgia GEO GG EUCOM 0.55 
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# Country or Territory ISO FIPS   COCOM SCORE  
154 Seychelles SYC SE AFRICOM 0.55 
122 Namibia NAM WA AFRICOM 0.55 
177 Tonga TON TN PACOM 0.55 
134 Panama PAN PM SOUTHCOM 0.54 
103 Macedonia, FYROM MKD MK EUCOM 0.53 
190 Vanuatu VUT NH PACOM 0.52 
13 Bahrain BHR BA CENTCOM 0.52 
83 Jamaica JAM JM SOUTHCOM 0.52 
119 Morocco MAR MO AFRICOM 0.52 
7 Argentina ARG AR SOUTHCOM 0.52 
143 Russia RUS RS EUCOM 0.52 
76 India IND IN PACOM 0.52 
36 China CHN CH PACOM 0.52 
49 Dominica DMA DO SOUTHCOM 0.50 
97 Lesotho LSO LT AFRICOM 0.50 
77 Indonesia IDN ID PACOM 0.50 
179 Tunisia TUN TS AFRICOM 0.50 
184 Ukraine UKR UP EUCOM 0.50 
192 Vietnam VNM VM PACOM 0.50 
8 Armenia ARM AM EUCOM 0.50 
58 Fiji FJI FJ PACOM 0.49 
174 Thailand THA TH PACOM 0.49 
65 Ghana GHA GH AFRICOM 0.49 
137 Peru PER PE SOUTHCOM 0.48 
138 Philippines PHL RP PACOM 0.47 
88 Kiribati KIR KR PACOM 0.47 
11 Azerbaijan AZE AJ EUCOM 0.46 
87 Kenya KEN KE AFRICOM 0.46 
71 Guyana GUY GY SOUTHCOM 0.46 
20 Bhutan BTN BT PACOM 0.46 
22 Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH BK EUCOM 0.46 
73 Honduras HND HO SOUTHCOM 0.46 
166 Suriname SUR NS SOUTHCOM 0.45 
53 El Salvador SLV ES SOUTHCOM 0.45 
3 Algeria DZA AG AFRICOM 0.45 
32 Cape Verde CPV CV AFRICOM 0.45 
50 Dominican Republic DOM DR SOUTHCOM 0.45 
167 Swaziland SWZ WZ AFRICOM 0.44 
51 Ecuador ECU EC SOUTHCOM 0.44 
117 Mongolia MNG MG PACOM 0.44 
108 Mali MLI ML AFRICOM 0.44 
194 Zambia ZMB ZA AFRICOM 0.43 
86 Kazakhstan  KAZ KZ CENTCOM 0.43 
173 Tanzania (United Republic of Tanzania) TZA TZ AFRICOM 0.43 
96 Lebanon LBN LE CENTCOM 0.43 
5 Angola AGO AO AFRICOM 0.43 
135 Papua New Guinea PNG PP PACOM 0.43 
107 Maldives MDV MV PACOM 0.43 
164 Sri Lanka  LKA CE PACOM 0.42 
52 Egypt EGY EG CENTCOM 0.42 
68 Guatemala GTM GT SOUTHCOM 0.42 
136 Paraguay PRY PA SOUTHCOM 0.41 
18 Belize BLZ BH SOUTHCOM 0.41 
27 Burkina Faso BFA UV AFRICOM 0.41 
115 Moldova (Republic of Moldova) MDA MD EUCOM 0.41 
61 Gabon GAB GB AFRICOM 0.41 
48 Djibouti DJI DJ AFRICOM 0.41 
79 Iraq IRQ IZ CENTCOM 0.40 
99 Libya LBY LY AFRICOM 0.39 
30 Cameroon CMR CM AFRICOM 0.39 
144 Rwanda RWA RW AFRICOM 0.39 
182 Tuvalu TUV TV PACOM 0.39 
131 Pakistan PAK PK CENTCOM 0.39 
29 Cambodia KHM CB PACOM 0.39 
152 Senegal SEN SG AFRICOM 0.38 
16 Belarus BLR BO EUCOM 0.38 
93 Kyrgyzstan KGZ KG CENTCOM 0.38 
183 Uganda UGA UG AFRICOM 0.38 
21 Bolivia BOL BL SOUTHCOM 0.37 
19 Benin BEN BN AFRICOM 0.37 
105 Malawi MWI MI AFRICOM 0.37 
98 Liberia LBR LI AFRICOM 0.37 
42 Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) CIV IV AFRICOM 0.37 
162 South Sudan SSD OD AFRICOM 0.37 
159 Solomon Islands SLB BP PACOM 0.37 
28 Burundi BDI BY AFRICOM 0.37 
91 Kosovo KSV KV EUCOM 0.37 
175 Timor-Leste (East Timor) TMP TT PACOM 0.36 
189 Uzbekistan UZB UZ CENTCOM 0.36 
62 Gambia, The GMB GA AFRICOM 0.36 
1 Afghanistan AFG AF CENTCOM 0.36 
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128 Nigeria NGA NI AFRICOM 0.36 
78 Iran IRN IR CENTCOM 0.36 
14 Bangladesh BGD BG PACOM 0.35 
126 Nicaragua NIC NU SOUTHCOM 0.35 
170 Syria (Syrian Arab Republic) SYR SY CENTCOM 0.35 
155 Sierra Leone SLE SL AFRICOM 0.35 
191 Venezuela VEN VE SOUTHCOM 0.34 
33 Central African Republic CAF CT AFRICOM 0.34 
44 Cuba CUB CU SOUTHCOM 0.33 
176 Togo TGO TO AFRICOM 0.32 
40 Congo (Kinshasa)/ Democratic Republic of the Congo ZAR CG AFRICOM 0.32 
123 Nepal NPL NP PACOM 0.32 
150 Sao Tome and Principe STP TP AFRICOM 0.32 
57 Ethiopia ETH ET AFRICOM 0.30 
39 Congo (Brazzaville)/ Republic of Congo COG CF AFRICOM 0.30 
120 Mozambique MOZ MZ AFRICOM 0.30 
193 Yemen YEM YM CENTCOM 0.30 
111 Mauritania MRT MR AFRICOM 0.29 
38 Comoros COM CN AFRICOM 0.29 
121 Myanmar (Burma) MMR BM PACOM 0.29 
94 Lao People’s Democratic Republic LAO LA PACOM 0.28 
72 Haiti HTI HA SOUTHCOM 0.27 
172 Tajikistan TJK TI CENTCOM 0.27 
127 Niger NER NG AFRICOM 0.27 
70 Guinea-Bissau GNB PU AFRICOM 0.27 
34 Chad TCD CD AFRICOM 0.26 
104 Madagascar MDG MA AFRICOM 0.26 
181 Turkmenistan TKM TX CENTCOM 0.25 
54 Equatorial Guinea GNQ EK AFRICOM 0.24 
165 Sudan SDN SU AFRICOM 0.24 
195 Zimbabwe ZWE ZI AFRICOM 0.24 
133 Palestinian Authority (Palestinian Territories) WBG 0 CENTCOM 0.23 
69 Guinea GIN GV AFRICOM 0.22 
55 Eritrea ERI ER AFRICOM 0.22 
89 Korea (North), Democratic People’s Republic of Korea PRK KN PACOM 0.16 
160 Somalia SOM SO AFRICOM 0.12 
 
Table 5.   Countries by overall summary propensity score,  
after The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization 
and Propensity Matching Tool. 
As CCMD’s and TSOC conduct theater campaign planning, current crises 
or emerging security situations may override the “matching tool” 
recommendations or ideal partner countries. For example, the 2014 Quadrennial 
Defense Review outlined several regions of concern within Africa:  
The demand for U.S. forces to expand the counterterrorism 
capabilities of allied or partner forces will likely increase in the 
coming years. The United States will continue to advise, train, and 
equip partner forces to perform essential tasks against terrorist 
networks, complementing U.S. activities in the field. Operations and 
activities in the Maghreb, Sahel, and Horn of Africa, for example, 
further our national security interests without a large commitment of 
U.S. forces.118 
                                            
118 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: DOD, 2014), 
37. 
 52
Of the 53 African nations within the area of responsibility of USAFRICOM, 
only six countries received a score greater than .51 on the “overall summary 
propensity score,” with the mean being .38. USAFRICOM also contains the 
lowest scoring country, Somalia, with a score of just .12.119 The low overall 
propensity for success in capacity building in Africa may create especially difficult 
situations for SOF units tasked with this mission, especially in high risk or 
challenging countries. 
Within USAFRICOM, the countries that ranked highest in “absorptive 
capacity of the PN military” were Mauritius, a small island nation in the Indian 
Ocean; Cape Verde, another island nation on the western coast Africa; South 
Africa, Botswana, and Ghana.120 Of these top countries, none falls within the 
regions of concern in the QDR. One of the countries that does fall within the 
QDR’s region of concern, Algeria, is in the Maghreb; it was the highest-scoring 
country on “absorptive capacity” of its military of all the countries that fall  
within the USAFRICOM area of responsibility and received an overall score of 
.45 despite a low rating of .22 in the U.S.- partnership relationship category. The 
.45 overall rating places Algeria in the second tier with other countries such as El 
Salvador, whose military received U.S. capacity-building efforts during a 
successful campaign against the FMLN in the 1980s with the assistance of U.S. 
Special Operations advisors. 121 
According to the RAND matching tool, Algeria is an ideal country for SOF 
engagement for several reasons. It is the largest country and has the second 
largest military in Africa, and it spends more on defense than any other African 
nation.122 Algeria borders Mali and Libya, two countries fraught with violence and 
terrorist havens, yet in fiscal year 2010, the United States only spent $1 million in 
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security cooperation expenditures on Algeria. In comparison, Somalia, the 
country with the absolute lowest score for building partner capacity, received 
$75.3 million in total security cooperation, security force assistance, and building 
partnership capacity expenditures, making it tenth overall in SC funding.123  
This discrepancy in security cooperation expenditures can be linked to a 
variety of factors and reinforces the notion that national security interests may 
trump ideal pairing for partner capacity building. Furthermore, a country may 
have a greater absorptive capacity in its military, but this is not the only criterion 
for choosing partner nations.  
As previously discussed, the debate over selecting countries for capacity 
building can be contentious and difficult; however, once a country is selected, the 
RAND reports make several recommendations that are applicable to SOF. The 
primary finding that contains overarching implications is that “matching matters”; 
however, one of the factors independent of PN context and wholly under the 
control of the United States relates to including a sustainment component to the 
initiative.124  The sustainment component highlights the fact that most U.S. SOF 
units have significant tactical and operational skills useful for building partner 
capacity. This usually includes small units of PN SOF or security forces, but falls  
short when it comes to developing ministerial level capacity or sustainment 
components. In cases where SOF has been successful, additional assets were 
required to meet these other requirements. For example, in the case of 
Colombia, the United States provided a complete package of helicopters under 
Plan Colombia, including pilot training, technical advisors, mechanic training, 
logistics and parts, and so on.125 This example illustrates that the U.S. SOF 
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ability for building partnership capacity is dependent on a wider effort and other 
U.S. military and government partnerships.  
In conclusion, this chapter has reviewed the data from the RAND reports 
and matching tool and provided several observations related to the employment 
of SOF in building capacity as well as the implication of the data from the 
matching tool and reports for CCMDs and TSOCs. The next chapter will provide 





V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis aimed to take the complex problem of selecting the best 
partner countries for building capacity and provide a useful tool and 
recommendations that would assist a TSOC or USSOCOM planner in developing 
security cooperation missions as part of a regional or theater campaign plan. The 
thesis used two reports on building partnership capacity by the RAND 
Corporation as a baseline to determine which factors are the most important, 
why, and under what circumstances would they be most effective.  
The RAND reports provided several general findings and recommendations 
that are applicable to the wider DOD security cooperation community. However, 
this thesis specifically focused on the reports’ applicability to SOF. Chapter IV, in 
particular, matched the RAND tool’s recommendations for best regions and 
countries to partner with U.S. national security concerns, particularly those 
surrounding counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. It found that the countries 
most ideal for partnering are the ones that need the least amount of capacity 
building. Conversely, the countries in need of the most capacity building are the 
ones that the RAND tool predicts are the least likely to succeed. This was 
particularly true in the African COCOM. In Algeria, where capacity, 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency needs matched, the United States 
invested only $1 million in FY2010. Somalia, by contrast, received $75.3 million 
and is predicted to be the least likely to absorb capacity building, according to the 
RAND tool.  
From these observations, this thesis concludes with the following 
recommendations for U.S. SOF efforts at building partnership capacity. First, the 
U.S. government should better develop authorizations, programs, and policies 
that lead to greater Department of State and Defense interoperability in matters 
related to security assistance and SOF security cooperation and capacity 
building. This coordination is particularly important for SOF because many of the 
Title 10 efforts to build partner capacity developed by the CCMDs or TSOCs 
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must meet Department of State approvals before they can be implemented. 
Therefore, greater coordination between these government agencies would 
smooth the process for initiating partnership and capacity building between U.S. 
SOF and various host nations.  
Furthermore, the RAND tool suggests that building partnership capacity 
requires more than just building a country’s military capabilities. It also requires 
building capacity in governance, economics and society. These tasks fall outside 
the purview of the DOD and require other U.S. agencies, including the 
Departments of State, Treasure, Justice, and U.S. AID. Better coordination 
between all of these U.S. entities would result in a more holistic approach to 
building partnership capacity. 
This recommendation is the most idealistic, ambitious, and difficult to 
implement due to the many stakeholders involved in the process of security 
engagement, as outlined in Chapter II. However, it is also critical to implement. 
Current pilot programs like the Global Security Contingency Fund, allow DOS or 
DOD to provide assistance to countries designated by DOS as important, with 
concurrence by DOD.126 The countries programmed to receive support in FY 
2012 included Nigeria, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Libya, Hungary, Romania, 
and Slovakia. 127 Information on the outcome of these pilot countries is not yet 
available. Nonetheless, the programs appear to a positive step towards 
developing true interoperability between the departments; however, as defense 
funding continues to decrease, these initiatives will be at risk for cancellation.  
The second recommendation is to synchronize security cooperation efforts 
to build partner capacity within TSOC campaign plans and leverage other DOD 
and interagency assets to fill in the gaps. In a fiscally austere environment each 
security cooperation mission must be carefully weighed and nested with the 
                                            
126 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, HR 1540,112th Cong., 1st sess., 
2011, sec 1207. 
127 Nina M. Serafino, Global Security Contingency Fund: Summary and Issue Overview, 
CRS Report R42641 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 
April 4, 2014), 8.  
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overarching theater and regional campaign plans. In addition, SOF may be 
required to perform certain portions of a capacity building effort due to mission 
requirements or constraints; however, TSOCs should look to leverage missing 
capabilities gaps within the TSOC and work closely with U.S. conventional forces 
and interagency partners to fill the gaps that SOF cannot address. For example, 
if a CCMD and TSOC agree to deploy a SOF unit to develop a counterterrorism 
capability in a particular country, the SOF unit is fully capable of developing and 
training a force at the tactical level; however, it lacks capabilities in developing 
supporting efforts like supply chain management for specialized equipment, or 
the procurement process for uniforms and equipment, or setting up Foreign 
Military Sales accounts to support the needs of the newly developed 
counterterrorism force. Therefore, SOF cannot build capacity alone. Not only 
does true capacity building require interagency cooperation; it also requires 
better integration between U.S. military forces and supporting units.  
These observations lead to the third recommendation: USSOCOM, in 
coordination with the OSD and interagency, should conduct a joint capabilities 
assessment in line with the doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, 
personnel, facilities (DOTMLPF), and interoperability model to determine long-
term solutions to security cooperation efforts and capacity building missions. This 
effort should specifically include how to employ SOF in early phases of assessing 
a partner country’s capability and military absorptive capacity, as well as how to 
incorporate a sustainment piece that would match the capacity of a partner 
country’s military and economy. Such an assessment could then be used to 
determine critical capability gaps within SOF and the seams between SOF and 
conventional forces capabilities, thus allowing for better unity of effort between 
SOF, conventional forces, and interagency in capacity building efforts.  
One of the challenges associated with such an interagency effort is lack of 
clear lines of authority and the amount of decentralization in the system. 
USSOCOM is technically the lead agency for Security Force Assistance, but they 
are not a force provider like the military services, and do not have legal 
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responsibility for a geographically area like a Geographic Combatant Command. 
Additionally each service providing forces to the various CCMDs has different 
policies and procedures on how they organize, man, and equip their forces for 
security cooperation and building partner capacity missions.  
The fourth recommendation involves the security cooperation organization 
and the embassy country team. USSOCOM and TSOCs should continue to 
review initiatives like the Special Operations Liaison Officer program that would 
allow a dedicated SOF officer to work with and advise the ambassador, chief of 
mission, defense attaché or military group commander on the unique capabilities 
and limitations that SOF units offer in regard to building partner capacity efforts. 
Currently the senior defense official within a given embassy or country team is 
typically not a SOF officer and does not have SOF experience. This lack of 
experience or understanding can lead to confusion and mistrust over what SOF 
units can accomplish, or how they fit into the larger regional or theater plans. 
In order to correct this problem, embassies should include a SOF liaison 
on its staff. However, some of the challenges to this approach include a lack of 
authorized positions within the country team’s table of distribution and 
allowances (TDA), lack of a defined career path for officers who perform these 
duties, and most importantly, the risk of overwhelming the interagency partners 
with too many military liaisons and creating an impression of attempting to 
become overly militaristic.   
Recommendations for further research 
Finally, this thesis concludes with suggestions for future research projects. 
The quantitative data from the RAND matching tool relies on open source data 
easily available to the common user. While this approach allows for greater 
access, it may have its limitations when observing SOF operations that may be 
classified. Future research could replace the pertinent data with up-to-date 
information from classified sources that may contain better fidelity and compare 
the outcome with the open source data.  
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Other research efforts could look at case studies where SOF units built 
capacity in the form of developing or supporting an insurgency to overthrow a 
regime and compare those findings with the findings and recommendations from 
the RAND reports.    
These are just a few suggestions for what is likely to be a field of greater 
interest as the United States draws down its forces in Afghanistan and yet seeks 
to be engaged in the world in less costly and large scale operations. Building 
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